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Article 2

THE PERPLEXITIES OF TRADE REGULATION
EDGAR A. BUTTLE

I.

STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
CONGRESS in 1890 gave statutory recognition to the idea that a
free private enterprise system requires effective competition as a safeguard for the public interest. But long before the enactment of the
Sherman Antitrust Act 1 the courts had developed a body of commonlaw doctrine based on the same principle: that free competition is the
price of free enterprise. The aim of the doctrine of restraint of trade
was to prevent private monopoly, to assure free enterprise. Senator
Sherman, at one point in his defense of his bill, said: "It does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized
principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our
'2
State and Federal governments."
The common-law doctrine of "restraint of trade" early acquired
a narrow technical meaning. It referred to convenants not to compete,
which covenants were subordinate to, and constituted part of the consideration for, a contract such as the sale of a business, on the legality
of which there was no doubt. A typical contract in restraint of trade
was an agreement by a man selling out his business that he would not
later re-enter the trade to compete with the buyer. Such agreements
were meant to protect the value of what a buyer had bought and paid
for-for example, good will, trade secrets, or technical know-how.
At first, all contracts in restraint of trade were adjudged invalid.
They were considered contrary to public policy because, as long as
law and custom discouraged transfers of residence or occupation
among tradespeople, they tended to deprive a person of the opportunity to earn a living and the community of his skilled services. With
the weakening of the rule of status and the growth of freedom in
economic affairs, as first the guild system and then the mercantilist
system became moribund, legal attitudes changed.
Gradually the courts came to distinguish between reasonable and
unreasonable restraints of trade. A covenant not to compete was held
valid, under the rule of reason, if the restriction was limited in space
and time to an extent appropriate to the bona fide interests of the
parties. To illustrate: A merchant selling his store in a county seat
EIDGAR A. BuTLE is a member of the New York Bar.
1 26 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
2 21 CONG. REC. 3146, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1890.
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might perhaps be bound by a covenant to refrain from re-entering the
same business within the next ten years anywhere in the county. But
if the buyer were to exact a promise that the merchant selling out
would never again in his lifetime resume that same line of business
anywhere in the state, the covenant would probably be held unenforceable. So much for contracts in restraint of trade in the original, technical sense.
During the second half of the nineteenth century a quite different
type of agreement not to compete became increasingly common, and
for want of a better term, when such agreements came before the
courts, lawyers and judges frequently referred to them as contracts in
restraint of trade. When regional, or even nation-wide, markets first
opened up, competition was quite severe and businessmen sought refuge from the costly readjustments and losses it entailed through combinations or agreements. In brief, they sought to free themselves from
the forces of competitive markets and to subject markets to collective
control by mutual promises to restrict output, divide markets, or fix
prices.
When the parties sought to enforce such agreements to eliminate
competition and centralize control of the market, the courts generally
held them contrary to public policy and void. Occasionally, however,
when one of these new-style agreements in restraint of trade did not
embrace all the firms in the market, and more rarely even when it
did, a court, applying the rule of reason, would uphold the contract.
Implicit in a judicial finding of reasonableness was an assumption
either that the agreement was harmless because ineffective, or that it
operated only to protect the legitimate interests of the parties from
ruinous competition.
Courts in a few states tacitly accepted the more than liberal doctrine that businessmen should be free in a private enterprise economy
to make whatever voluntarily concerted arrangements they considered
gainful. But the courts that did so usually inquired into how the
combination had used its power. If they found no obvious abuse of
power they upheld such agreements, invalidating only those that appeared to have used their collective power to exploit consumers or
oppress rivals. Most state courts, however, condemned all agreements
to restrict competition among business rivals, regardless of the conditions that prompted them and regardless of how they operated.3
3

Among the cases in which agreements to restrict competition were held invalid
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Such, briefly, was the state of the common law on contracts in
restraint of trade when the Sherman Act was passed.
Nothing in the history of the Sherman Act or its language supports the view that Congress contemplated that the courts would discriminate between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade
when the sole object of the combination is restriction of competition
among the parties and control of the market. A minority of state
courts did, however, make such a distinction in applying the commonlaw doctrine of restraint of trade to collusive agreements for sharing
or controlling the market.
Apparently the Supreme Court correctly epitomized the objectives
of the Sherman Act when, after a third of a century of interpretation
of the law, it said: "The fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was
to secure equality of opportunity and protect the public against the
evils commonly incident to the destruction of competition."'
per se at common law were: India Bagging Ass'n v. B. Koch & Co., 14 La. 168 (1859);
Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871); Central Ohio Salt Co.
v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio 666 (1880); DeWitt Wire Cloth Co. v. New Jersey Wire Cloth Co.,
14 N. Y. Supp. 277, 16 Daly 529 (1890); Chapin v. Brown Brothers, 83 Iowa 156, 48
N. W. 1094 (1891); Moore v. Bennett, 140 Ill. 69, 29 N. E. 888 (1892); People v. Milk
Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 39 N. E. 1062 (1895). For discriminating analyses of this line
of cases, consult Judge Taft's opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), and Milton Handier, A Study of the Construction and
Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws, TNEC Monograph No. 38 (Washington
1941).
"Trusts" were held illegal, as contrary to public policy in Mallory v. Hanaur Oil
Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W. 398 (1888); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb.
700, 46 N. W. 155 (1890); People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582,
24 N. E. 834 (1890); State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio 137, 30 N. E. 279
(1892). Other combinations in restraint of trade involving transfers of property were
condemned in Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N. W. 1102 (1889); Distilling &
Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 Ill.
448, 41 N. E. 188 (1895); Craft v. McConoughy,
79 Ill. 346 (1875); Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio 320, 24 N. E. 660 (1890). See,
also, STOCKING & WATXINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE,

6, 18, 260-62, 270, 346-47,

351-52, 354 (20th Cent. Fund 1951).
4 Ramsay v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 260 U. S. 501, 512, 43 S. Ct. 167, 168, 67 L. Ed.
368, 370 (1923). In applying the law both before and after 1923, the Court has often
expressed the same view of its purpose. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, the Court said: ". . . it has repeatedly been held . . . that the purpose of the
statute is to maintain free competition in interstate commerce." 257 U. S. 377, 400, 42
S. Ct. 114, 117, 66 L. Ed. 284, 291 (1921). In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U. S. 392, 397, 47 S. Ct. 377, 379, 71 L. Ed. 700, 705 (1927), the Court said: "...
it cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it
are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of
monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition." See, to the same
effect, National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 115, 129, 25 S. Ct. 379, 381-382, 49
L. Ed. 689, 694 (1906) and Fashion Originators Guild v. F. T. C., 312 U. S. 457, 464,
61 S. Ct. 703, 706, 85 L. Ed. 949, 952-953 (1941). Despite the frequent reiteration of
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In 1897 the Supreme Court in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case5 rejected the rule of reason over the vigorous dissent of
four justices. In 1909, twelve years after the Supreme Court had rejected the rule of reason, Congress rejected a proposal to amend the
Sherman Act so that only combinations in unreasonable restraint of
trade would be unlawful. In recommending rejection of this amendment the Senate Judiciary Committee said:
To inject into the act the question of whether an agreement or
combination is reasonable or unreasonable would render the act as a
criminal or penal statute indefinite and uncertain, and hence, to that
extent, utterly nugatory and void, and would practically amount to
a repeal of that part of the act. ... To destroy or undermine it at the
present juncture, when combinations are on the increase,.... would be
a calamity.'
In 1933 Chief Justice Hughes remarked that the Sherman Antitrust Act,6 "as a charter of freedom, . .. has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. . . . The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or
artificial. Its general phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental
7
objects, set up the essential standard of reasonableness."1
A modern view of the Sherman Act can start, however, in 1911
clear pronouncements of the foregoing kind, the Court has sometimes seemed to be
unaware of their practical implications. See, for example, United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 S. Ct. 473, 62 L. Ed. 968 (1918); Buckeye Powder Co.
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., et al., 248 U. S. 55, 39 S. Ct. 38, 63 L. Ed.
123 (1918) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293, 64
L. Ed. 343 (1920); International Shoe Co. v. F. T. C., 280 U. S. 291, 50 S. Ct. 89, 74
L. Ed. 431 (1930); and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53
S. Ct. 471, 17 L. Ed. 825 (1933).
5 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540, 41
L. Ed. 1007 (1897). Amending Antitrust Act, S. REP. No. 848, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.,
10-11.
C July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7, 15. Sections 1 and 2 provide,
in substance, that:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal.... Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor...
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor...."
In 1937, Section 1 of this Act was amended by the Miller-Tydings Act relating to
resale price maintenance under the State Fair Trade Acts, c. 690, tit. VIII, 50 STAT. 693,
15 U. S. C. § 1.
7 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 359-360, 53 S. Ct. 471,
473-474, 77 L. Ed. 825, 829 (1933).
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with the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.8 That
opinion declared the rule of Sherman Act construction to be the "rule
of reason," and sketched its scope, its limits, and the main line of its
future development. It clarified prior doubts about the relationship
between the Sherman Act and the common law, and defined the connection between Section 1 and Section 2 offenses. The controversies of
an earlier day over the reasoning of Standard Oil have receded into
history.
The Court reviewed Standard's history since 1870 and found that,
after 1899, at least, Standard had monopoly power over refined petroleum, its transportation by pipeline and the sale of refined products.
Standard's "absolute control" in these phases was considered to bring
about, as "an inevitable result," control also over the market for
crude oil. Standard's position had been achieved through partnerships,
mergers and other combinations with competing and complementary
interests as well as through the internal expansion of the Standard
group itself. In its growth, Standard had utilized certain practices
deemed "unfair" such as local price cutting, espionage, and the procurement from railroads of preferential rates and rebates. These practices helped to force some compedtors either to join the combination
or to abandon the oil business.
The common law, as the Court restated it, viewed restraints of
trade and monopolization as two phases or degrees of the same phenomenon. The various early common law and English statutory prohibitions dealing with both subjects were directed to the same ends: to
protect individuals or the public against those evils "which led to the
public outcry against monopolies." These were "(1) The power which
the monopoly gave ... to fix ... the price and thereby to injure the
public; (2) [and to impose some] . .. limitation on production; and

(3) The danger of deterioration in quality.., which [is] the inevitable resultant of the monopolistic control over... [an article's] production and sale." 9
Summarizing the common law regarding restraints of trade, the
Court concluded that it'was dominated by "the dread of enhancement
of prices and of other wrongs which it was thought would flow from
the undue limitation on competitive conditions." This fear, it said,
8

221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911).

9 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 52, 58, 31 S. Ct.

502, 512, 515, 55 L. Ed. 619, 642, 644 (1911).
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"'led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as
illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions." Such conclusion, the Court felt, might stem
either from the nature or character of the contract or act, or from "surrounding circumstances" which gave "rise to the inference or presumption" that they tended "to bring about the evils, such as enhancement
of prices, which were considered to be against public policy."' 0
The net result was an assimilation of the terms "monopoly" and
"restraint of trade." At common law these evils caused such conduct
"to be treated as coming within monopoly and sometimes to be called
monopoly and the same considerations caused monopoly because of
its operation and effect, to be brought within and spoken of generally
as impeding the due course of or being in restraint of trade.""
Before the Clayton 2 and the Federal Trade Commission' 3 Acts
of 1914, the regulation of commercial practices other than those which
come within the purvue of unreasonable restraints of trade under the
Sherman Act were subject mainly to State law. The common law provided a few rules for regulating competition, among them the doctrine
of implied warranty of merchantability, protecting buyers, and the rule
against misappropriation of trade secrets, protecting rival sellers. But
the most important common-law rule bearing on commercial practice
gave an injured competitor a right of action for deceitful diversion of
patronage.14 Thus if one trader, A, imitated the trade-mark of B and
took business away from him, then A became liable to B for damages.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. The Court's exposition of the common law in the Standard Oil case is in
striking contrast both to the opinion of Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe
and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), and to Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400, 24 S. Ct. 436, 468, 48
L. Ed. 679, 726 (1904), and in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U. S. 373, 409, 31 S. Ct. 376, 385, 55 L. Ed. 502, 519 (1911). Whether the Supreme
Court was right or wrong about the common law as a matter of legal history, its treatment of the subject is the basic statement of the ideas which have become the standard
of Sherman Act construction.
12 38 STAT. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 12ff (1914). Amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 49
STAT. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1936).
13 38 STAT. 717, 15 U. S. C. § 41ff (1914). Amended, March 21, 1938, 52 STAT. 111.
14 Such was the meaning of the doctrine of "unfair competition." The courts
rigorously limited the right to recover damages to instances in which a trader could prove
that he had lost customers to a rival because the rival had "passed off" his products
as those of the plaintiff. But if a manufacturer sold aluminum washboards as zinc washboards without imitating a rival's mark or name, though he might deceive many buyers,
neither a prosecutor nor any rival manufacturer who lost sales by such a practice could
stop it. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
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These common-law rules became increasingly inadequate as railroads replaced canals, steam and electricity replaced water and animal
power, factories replaced workshops, and national markets replaced
purely local markets. With a complex organization of middlemen,
agents, district representatives, and local managers standing between
primary producers and ultimate consumers, opportunities for sharp
practice multiplied. As great consolidations came to dominate manufacturing, and as chain stores and mail-order houses with a nationwide scope of operations replaced independent distributors, merchandising became increasingly an impersonal, partly mechanized routine. Thus the common-law rules, originally intended to regulate transactions among individuals with about equal bargaining power, proved
inadequate to the task of regulating these complex relations among
giant corporations, medium-sized and small businessmen.
There were five significant substantive provisions in the 1914
legislation. Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act declared unlawful
"unfair methods of competition." Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act
prohibited price discrimination and so-called exclusive-dealing or tying
contracts-that is, the sale or lease of goods on condition that the
buyer or lessee "shall not use or deal in the goods" of a competitor
or competitors of the seller or lessor. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
forbade the acquisition of stock in a competing corporation, and Section 8 prohibited interlocking directorates among corporations engaged
in the same line of trade. The Clayton Act provisions applied only
"where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or
M 5
tend to create a monopoly.
A consumer could have sued, charging fraud, but in practice such a procedure offered no
public protection because an individual buyer had too little at stake to make litigation
worth while. In effect, the common law limited remedial action against unfair competition to instances in which a trader trespassed on some property interest of a competitor.
See A Symposium on the Law of Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175-454 (1936);
and Leverett S. Lyon and Associates, I GOVRNMENT AND ECONOmIC LmFE, c. 9, The

Brookings Institution (Washington 1939).
15 One of the circumstances prompting the 1914 legislation was the Supreme Court's
introduction of the rule of reason in applying the Sherman Act. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911); and United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 (1911). The sudden
assumption by the judiciary of power to discriminate between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade implied, or at least suggested to many members of Congress, that
the courts would undertake to define what business practices or market policies make
a trust "good" or "bad". Jealous of its legislative prerogatives, Congress did not propose
to leave to the courts such a lawmaking power. See S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess.
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MERGERS AND MONOPOLY POWER

THE perplexing problem of ascertaining that mergers have or
will' unreasonably restrain trade or create monopolies has continued
this past year to engage considerable attention of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice since there have been so
many. The Commission has recently concluded a study of corporate
acquisitions for the Congress. It finds that we are in the midst of a
major merger cycle. Since 1949, the pace has been rising; in 1954 the
number of reported mergers was three times that of 1949. There have
been 1,773 mergers from 1948 to 1954. The Chairman of the Com7
mission regards the trend as "very disturbing."'
The Department in recent months has instituted three important
cases challenging the legality under the Clayton Act of mergers in the
hotel, shoe and whiskey industries. In addition, it has publicly disclosed its disapproval of the fusion of Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube,"" and its acquiescence in the mergers of the
smaller automobile companies. These concrete acts provide some clue
to the Department's real views on the meaning and scope of amended
Section 7.
By its 1950 amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act Congress
sought to strengthen prior limitations on mergers, resulting in monopoly. Old Section 7 did not cover mergers consummated by other than
stock acquisition. In addition, court interpretations had considerably
narrowed mergers held to be barred by the former provisions.19 These
decisions, many felt, frustrated apparent Congressional design and,
as a result, Section 7 fell short of its -intended purpose to stop in its
incipiency undue concentration of economic power or monopoly. Moreover, the 1950 Columbia Steel2" decision accented the limitations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act in curbing mergers. 2 ' This background
16 Pre-merger clearance may be obtained by submitting clear proof that a particular
merger will not unreasonably interfere with competition.
17 Testimony before Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly, N. Y. Times, June 2,
1955, 47.
18 Department of Justice Release, Sept. 30, 1954,
19 See Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 51 F. 2d 656 (3d Cir.
1931); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. I. C. C., 66 F. 2d 37 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 291 U. S. 651, 54 S. Ct. 556, 78 L. Ed. 1045 (1934) ; United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N. D. Ohio 1935). Cf. International Shoe Co.
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U. S.291, 50 S. Ct. 89, 74 L. Ed. 431 (1930).
20 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 68 S. Ct. 1107, 92 L. Ed. 1533

(1948).
21

H. R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1949).
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immediately preceding amended Section 7 discloses the apparent Congressional objective of establishing more effective rules against mergers. This intention provides the main guide to the administrative and
judicial construction of that provision.
As part of its plan, Congress made three major changes in Section
7. First, it broadened the Section's reach to cover corporations acquiring the "whole or any part" not only of the stock, but also "of the
assets"" of another company. Second, it eliminated from the statute
the illegality test of whether the acquisition's effect "may be" substantially to lessen competition between the acquiring and the acquired
corporations. Finally, Congress struck the prior test of whether the
acquisition might restrain commerce "in any community," and substituted as the measure whether "in any line of commerce in any section of the country" the acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
In Matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,23 the Federal Trade Commission delineated in broad terms its view of Section 7. The trial examiner there dismissed the complaint without prejudice on grounds
that its allegations were not supported prima facie by reliable evidence.
The Commission reversed, finding that probative evidence tended to
show the acquisition of two substantial competitors by the second
largest American miller. The Commission looked at Pillsbury's market
position before and after the two challenged acquisitions, both in the
national market and in the Southeast, the geographic area principally
involved. Pillsbury's shares were substantial, and the increase in its
share of some markets through the acquisitions was also substantial.
In the mix market, for example, Pillsbury increased its leading share
in the Southeast from 22.7 percent to 44.9 percent and moved ahead
nationally from second to first place, increasing its share from 16
percent to approximately 23 percent.
But market share was only one of several factors which the Commission considered in finding a prima facie case of illegality. Rejecting any automatic test of illegality, the Commission pointed out that
"competition cannot be directly measured; no single set of standards
can be applied to the whole range of American industries. No single
characteristic of an acquisition," the Commission continued, would
in all cases "of itself be sufficient to determine its effect on competi22
23

Italics added.
F. T. C. Dkt. 6000 (1953).
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tion. For this reason," the Commission concluded, "it would not be
sufficient to show" that the two companies "control a substantial"
dollar volume of sales "or that a substantial portion of commerce is
affected." Instead, the Commission viewed its task under Section 7
as requiring "a case-by-case examination of all relevant factors," in
order to ascertain the probable economic consequences.
At the same time the Commission made clear that its "examination of all relevant factors" did not call for application of Sherman
Act tests. It squarely recognized the Congressional intent that such
tests are not meant for Section 7; the essential difference, in the Commission's view, seems to be that the Clayton Act requires a "less
stringent burden of proof."
Thus the Commission concluded that, though the Sherman Act
was not transgressed, the facts nevertheless established a prima facie
violation of Section 7. Without stressing any factor particularly, and
without indicating what might even be relevant in a different industry
and a different market, the Commission, in reaching its conclusion,
emphasized the following factors: a pattern of acquisitions in the
industry and by Pillsbury particularly; a general increase in the
majors' percentage market shares; a decline in the number of mills;
a lack of new entries and a movement in the direction of oligopoly in
the urban markets.
The Commission reversed the Examiner and remanded the Pillsbury case for further hearing, pointing out that the effect of a merger
must be tested with reference to carefully defined markets in regions
where the merging companies do business. For Section 7 cannot be
satisfied by a mere showing that the merging companies do a large
dollar volume of business. Since that provision is concerned with
probable substantial lessening of competition and tendency to monopoly, it applies only where such prospective adverse impact in defined
markets can be shown.
III. MEASURING MONOPOLY POWER
MEASURING

monopoly power seems to depend upon a full evalua-

tion of the market and its functioning, to determine whether on balance the defendant's power over the interrelated elements of supply,
price and entry is sufficiently great to be classed as monopoly power.
While the decisions illuminate the economic theory of the courts in
evaluating these facts, they provide no magic formula for simplifying
the inquiry.
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Initially relevant are the salient characteristics of the merging
companies. These include: the size of each (measured perhaps by
assets, total sales, total capacity, etc.); their major products; location of their plants; geographic market areas in which each sells or
buys; their methods of sale, and classes of customers; sales of major
products in major markets prior to the acquisition; special technologies
24
or know-how; and growth history.
The markets principally affected may be identified after study of
the product relations between the acquiring and acquired company.
If certain classes of products of the two companies are similar and
are sold to similar customers, this is a relevant market for study;
if a customer has acquired a supplier, the market in which the supplier
sold products which will in the future be diverted, in whole or in part,
to the acquiring company, may be most important.
In any case, the markets affected, in terms of products, geographic areas, and, where possible, market levels, e.g., manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, institutional users, etc., may require identification. This is so despite the fact that it may be possible to find markets'
absolute boundaries.
Product, geographic, and functional markets identified, it may
then become relevant to examine such questions as:
(a) What companies buy or sell in the market, how many, and
what are the significant differences between them: (i) large, medium,
and small (market shares, or rank of large companies, etc.); (ii) degrees of vertical integration; (iii) uses of the product; and (iv) the
significance of the product study in the output or in the purchases of
different companies.
(b) What methods of sales are used in the market: (i) how are
the prices of different sellers related; what of price history; (ii) how
free are buyers or sellers to seek new suppliers or outlets; what determines whether changes will be made?
(c) __What are the opportunities for entry of new companies or
for expansion of existing companies into particular product or geographic markets?
(d) What are the opportunities for innovation in products, in
techniques, in methods of sale, etc.?
(e) What types of natural limitations on resources, economies of
24 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-Trust
Laws, 125 (March 31, 1955).
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sale, or special national policies modify the conditions under which
companies compete?
(f) What is the long-run supply and demand picture and how
does it influence the character of competition?
All of such facts cannot and need not be investigated in each case;
only those relevant in particular market contexts, and obtainable at
reasonable cost, should become a part of the record. In certain cases
the relevant facts that can be obtained at reasonable cost may still
leave gaps in the information that would be helpful in reaching greater
certainty as to the competitive consequences of an acquisition. While
sufficient data to support a conclusion is required, sufficient data to
give the enforcement agencies, the courts, and business, certainty as to
competitive consequences, would nullify the words "Where the effect
may be" in the Clayton Act and convert them into "Where the effect
is.

25

Immediate consequences of merger include changes in the size
and structure of the acquiring company and the adjustments of other
companies operating in the markets affected. In some cases such adjustments may take place in a market for a product the acquired company bought, particularly where the acquiring company can supply the
acquired company with significant items which the acquired company
formerly purchased. Or, adjustments may work themselves out in the
markets in which the acquired company sold, especially when the
output of the acquired company will no longer be sold to other companies but will be diverted to the acquiring company. When the
acquired and acquiring companies operate in the same markets, however, effects may be most marked among competitors of the acquiring
and the acquired company. In any case, the magnitude of the competitive effects of an acquisition will in part depend on adjustments by
2
other companies to the actual and expected shifts in markets affected. 1
Long-range competitive consequences may relate to:
(a) Changes in the opportunity for sellers to make independent
decisions as to products, prices, advertising, sales methods, channels
of sales, classes of customers, and business activities in which they
will engage; and/or
(b) Changes in the opportunity for buyers to shop freely for
products, prices, channels of purchases and classes of suppliers, and
25
26

Id., 125-126.
Id., 126-127.
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to select the business activities in which they will engage.
An acquisition which substantially reduces the incentive of sellers
or potential sellers to enter new markets and to improve their products
or services, widen their distribution, lower their prices, or pass cost
savings on to customers may substantially lessen competition.
Similarly, an acquisition which substantially reduces the incentive
of buyers or potential buyers to seek to purchase what they need at the
lowest price, to shop alternative sources until they have made satisfactory arrangements, and to sell or resell in their own ways may
27
substantially lessen competition or tend to monopoly.
IV.

UNIFORM CONDUCT AS PROOF OF PRICE FIXING
AND PRODUCTION CONTROL

CERTAIN forms of conduct, such as agreements among competitors
to fix market price or control production, are conclusively presumed
to be illegal, by reason of their nature or their necessary effect, so that
they can quickly and positively be adjudged violations of the Sherman Act. In such cases, inquiry under the Rule of Reason is over once
it has been decided that the conspiracy or agreement under review in
fact constitutes price rigging or production control.
Under certain circumstances agreement or conspiracy to fix prices
or to control production may be proved by uniform conduct. This is
often given the inartful and ambiguous label of "conscious parallelism." In one sense, "conscious" may mean no more than knowledge
that a particular course of conduct has been followed by competitors.
And "parallelism" may be used as a synonym for "collusion" or only
to signify uniformity of business behavior where "uniformity" is a
neutral term.
To avoid such confusion, the legal significance of uniform business
conduct can best be understood against the background of certain
decisions considering the nature and type of evidence relevant to proof
of concerted action. In EasternStates Retail Lumber DealersAssociation v. United States,2 8 for example, the Association had systematically circulated among its members reports naming wholesale
dealers who, members had reported, sold directly to consumers. The
evidence showed that upon receipt of these reports, a significant number of retailers ceased to do business with offending wholesalers. Re27 Id., 127.
28 234 U. S. 600, 34 S. Ct. 951, 58 L. Ed. 1490 (1914).
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jecting the defense that no combination or conspiracy had been shown,
the Court said:
C* * * It is elementary * * * that conspiracies are seldom capable

of proof by direct testimony and may be inferred from the things
actually done, and when in this case by concerted action the names of
wholesalers who were reported as having made sales to consumers were
periodically reported to the other members of the associations, the conspiracy to accomplish that which
was the natural consequence of such
2 9
action may be readily inferred.

Soon after, the Federal Trade Commission, apparently building
on this and like cases, announced" that "when a number of enterprises
follow a parallel course of action in the knowledge and contemplation
of the fact that all are acting alike, they have, in effect, formed an
agreement. * * * The obvious fact [is] that the economic effect of
identical prices achieved through conscious parallel action is the same
as that of similar prices achieved through overt collusion, and, for this
reason, the Commission treated the conscious parallelism of action as
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 3 Such developments fostered the notion that conspiracy necessarily followed from
identical conduct by competitors-provided each knew what the other
was doing.
The Supreme Court laid this notion to rest in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.3 2 The Court concluded that while uniform business behavior is evidence relevant to
proof of agreement, it is not sufficient of itself to overcome a jury
verdict based on sufficient other evidence that the defendant's conduct
was not in fact concerted.
The Supreme Court reasoning is that "Conscious parallelism" is
not a blanket equivalent of conspiracy. Its probative value in establishing the ultimate fact of conspiracy will vary case by case. Proof
of agreement, express or implied, is still indispensable to the establishment of a conspiracy under the anti-trust laws.
The significance of uniform action may depend, in any one in29 Id. at 612, 34 S. Ct. at 612, 58 L. Ed. at 1499.
30 Federal Trade Commission, Notice to the Staff: In re: Commission Policy Toward

Geographic Pricing Practices (Oct. 12, 1948).
31 See also, Milgram v. Lowe's Inc., 192 F. 2d 483 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied
343 U. S. 929, 72 S. Ct. 762, 96 L. Ed. 1339 (1952); but see Fanchon & Marco v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84, 104 (S.D. Cal. 1951), cert. denied 345 U. S.
964, 73 S. Ct. 950, 97 L. Ed. 1383 (1953).
32 346 U. S. 537, 540-541, 74 S. Ct. 257, 259-260, 98 L. Ed. 273, 278-279 (1954).
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stance, on a variety of factors. How pervasive is the uniformity?
Does it extend to price alone or to all other terms and conditions of
sale? How nearly identical is the uniformity? How long has the
uniformity continued? What is the time lag, if any, between a change
by one competitor and that of the other or others? Is the product
involved homogenous or differentiated? In the case of price uniformity, have the defendants raised as well as lowered prices in parallel
fashion? Can the conduct, no matter how uniform, be adequately explained by independent business justifications? Upon the answers to
questions like these depends the weight to be accorded parallel action
in any given case.
V.

AGREEMENTS TO DIVIDE MARKET

WHERE actual or potential competitors agree not to compete in
specified territories, or for specified customers, the consequence is to
reduce the number of sellers in each affected market. Competition
among the contracting parties is eliminated even more completely
than had they agreed on prices but still did business in the relevant
markets. The contracting parties gain only if the result is to give
each a substantial degree of power in his own market. If a large number of strong competitors remain despite the contract, no contracting
party profits from elimination of even a significant competitor. Where
market division agreements among competitors are proved, they are
33
held to be unreasonable, on the analogy of the Trenton Potteries
decision, by reason of their character and necessary effect on competition. They are agreements with no purpose other than the elimination
of competition; and, where significant shares of the market are involved, their effect on the degree of competition in the market can be
severe.
Market division cases thus far have all concerned competitors who
as a group possessed substantial, and often dominant, market power.
The conduct struck down as price fixing in Addyston Pipe & Steel

Co. v. United States34 was partly based on market division among

manufacturers supplying about two-thirds of markets where they did
the bulk of their business. Similarly, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 35 condemned the allocation of market territories be33 273 U. S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377, 71 L. Ed. 700 (1927).
14 175 U. S. 211, 20 S. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136 (1899).
" 341 U. S. 593, 71 S. Ct. 971, 95 L. Ed. 1199 (1951).
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tween the dominant American producer of tapered roller bearings and
British and French firms, the latter controlled jointly by Timken and
its British competitor. The same result has been reached in several
lower-court cases involving territorial market division or agreements
not to sell to a rival's customers.3 6 While in no Supreme Court case
have the facts been limited exclusively to simple market divisidn
among competitors, there is little doubt, either as a matter of principle
or of precedent, that agreements among competitors for market division should be and are treated like price control arrangements as inherently illegal.
VI. EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST ATTACK
CONTRARY to the foregoing, however, Congress has decided that in

some industries competition shall not be entirely free. Pursuant to
that policy, a regulatory body is authorized. It may either by its own
or by approval of private conduct, control market entry,3 7 eliminate
existing competition, 38 or fix rates or prices.30 Private actions ap33 United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S. D. N. Y. 1944);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319, 67 S. Ct. 1634, 91 L. Ed. 2077 (1947),
affirming though not discussing this issue, 63 F. Supp. 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); United
States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S. D. N. Y. 1949); Johnson
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176 (E. D. Tenn. 1940), aff'd 123 F. 2d
1016 (6th Cir. 1941). All these cases concern arrangements affecting large fractions of
market supply.
.17 Section 7(e) of the Natural Gas Act provides, for example, that the Federal
Power Commission shall issue a certificate "to any applicant . . .if it is found that the
applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and the proper service which . . .
is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." 52 STAT.
824 (1938); 56 STAT. 83 (1947), 15 U. S. C. § 717f; and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Lines
Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 169 F. 2d 881, 884 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denled
335 U. S.854, 69 S. Ct. 81, 93 L. Ed. 402 (1948). Similarly, the Federal Communications
Act directs the Commission to grant a license to any qualified applicant "if the public
convenience, interest or necessity will be served." 48 STAT. 1083 (1934); 49 STAT. 1475
(1936); 66 STAT. 714 (1952), 47 U. S. C. § 307. The Civil Aeronautics Act negatively
directs the Board to deny an application unless the purpose served "is required by the
public convenience and necessity." 52 STAT. 987 (1938) ; 54 STAT. 1235 (1940) ; 69 STAT.
49 (1955), 49 U. S. C. § 481; similarly note the Motor Carriers Act, c. 104, Pt. II, § 207
(1887); 49 STAT. 551 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § 307.
38 Consolidation of existing or potential rivals is generally limited only by the
requirement that the transaction be "consistent with the public interest." See, e.g.,
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887); 37 STAT. 566 (1912); 41 STAT. 480, 482
(1920); 42 STAT. 27 (1921); 48 STAT. 217-220 (1933); 48 STAT. 1080 (1934); 49 STAT.
543 (1935); 54 STAT. 905 (1940); 63 STAT. 5 (1949); 49 U. S. C. § 5; Federal Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1080 (1934); 68 STAT. 64 (1954); 47 U. S. C. 9 221, similarly,
note the Federal Power Act, c. 285 § 203 (1920) ; 49 STAT. 849 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 824;
cf. Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT. 1001 (1938) ; 54 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 488,
barring Board approval of a merger "which would result in creating a monopoly . . .
and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier." Compare Am erican
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proved by such regulatory bodies are, in some instances, exempt from
antitrust attack.4" Where no such exemption is specified, however,
there may still remain difficult problems of accommodating regulatory
standards with the antitrust laws. 4
VII.

PRICE DISCRIMINATION

THE most difficult, and probably the most basic problem
countered in consideration of the antitrust laws arises from the
parent division of these laws into two parts. The Sherman Act on
one hand and the Robinson-Patman and fair trade legislation on

enapthe
the

Airlines, Inc. Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C. A. B. 365, 379
(1946) (merger rejected since it "would impair the competition we deem requisite to
insure the development and maintenance of an adequate transportation system") with
TWA, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 184 F. 2d 66 (2d Cir. 1950).
39 The Reed-Bulwinkle Act, for example, authorizes the ICC to approve rate agreements among carriers provided they are "in furtherance of the national transportation
policy" and accord "to each party the free and unrestrained right to take independent
action either before or after any determination arrived at through such procedure."
24 STAT. 380 (1887) ; 37 STAT. 566 (1912) ; 41 STAT. 480, 482 (1920) ; 42 STAT. 27 (1921) ;
48 STAT. 217, 220 (1933); 48 STAT. 1080 (1934); 49 STAT. 543 (1935); 54 STAT. 905
(1940); 63 STAT. 5 (1949); 49 U. S. C. § 5. See also, the Civil Aeronautics Act which
requires filing with and approval by the Board of understandings "relating to the
establishment of transportation rates." 52 STAT. 1004 (1948); 54 STAT. 1235 (1940); c.
318, § 4(b), 56 STAT. 301 (1942); 49 U. S. C. § 492.
40 For example the Interstate Commerce Act provides that "any carriers . . .
participating in a transaction approved or authorized ... are relieved from the operation
of the anti-trust laws . . . ." 24 STAT. 380 (1887); 37 STAT. 566 (1912); 41 STAT. 480,
482 (1920); 42 STAT. 27 (1921); 48 STAT. 217, 220 (1933); 48 STAT. 1080 (1934); 49
S2 AT. 543 (1935) ; 54 STAT. 905 (1940) ; 63 STAT. 5 (1949) ; 49 U. S. C. § 5, and also see
same section pertaining to relief from liability for rate-making agreements. Similarly,
the Shipping Act states that "every agreement . . . lawful under this section shall be
excepted from the provisions of Sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15 . . . .. " 39 STAT. 733
(1916); 49 STAT. 1987, 2016 (1936); 46 U. S. C. § 814. And the Civil Aeronautics Act
provides that "any person affected by any order made under Sections . . . shall be ...
relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws' . . . in so far as may be necessary to
enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order."
52 STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 494. Finally, the Federal Communications Act
provides that "the Commission shall enter an order approving . . . such consolidation
. and thereupon any . . . laws making consolidations . . . unlawful shall not
apply .... ." c. 652, § 222 (1934) ; 57 STAT. 5 (1943) ; 61 STAT. 501 (1947) ; 47 U. S. C.
§ 222. Even under these express exemptions, however, difficult problems of construction
may arise.
41 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 456, 65 S. Ct. 716, 725, 89 L. Ed.
1051 (1945) ; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199, 60 S. Ct. 182, 188-189,
84 L. Ed. 181, 190-191 (1939); S. S. W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191
F. 2d 658, 661 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas,
Electric Light & Power Co., 184 F. 2d 552, 560 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S.
906, 71 S. Ct. 282, 95 L. Ed. 655 (1950); later opinion in independent proceedings, 194
F. 2d 89 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 343 U. S. 963, 72 S. Ct. 1056, 96 L. Ed. 1360
(1952).
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other, at least on the surface, seem to represent opposing points of
view. The Sherman Act commands every businessman to set his own
prices independently, and protects him from coercion by others who
would interfere with his right to act independently. Robinson-Patman
and fair trade, however, promote uniform prices administered on
an industry-wide basis.
The Robinson-Patman Act4 2 prohibiting price discrimination has
often been criticized by those who point to the "conflict between hard
competition and soft competition", and the difference between "injury
to competition" and "injury to a competitor". In addition, this Act,
more than any other statute, apparently provides ammunition to those
who decry the confusion in the anti-trust laws.43
The antitrust consequences of a business transaction involving
discrimination in price or terms of sale are primarily governed by Section 2 of the amended Clayton Act.44 Section 2 of the original Clayton
Act was principally directed at geographical price discrimination destructive of competition among sellers4 5 . The emergence of chain
stores and mail-order houses in the twenties, however, was thought to
jeopardize the survival of independent wholesalers and retailers, and
shifted the market significance of discrimination practices to the devitalization of competition among buyers. A Federal Trade Commission
investigation, instituted to analyze the causal market forces in the
"independent's" decline and to propose appropriate legal remedies,
42 38 STAT. 730 (1914); 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13.
43 See e.g., The Testimony of Edward R. Johnston before the Sub-Committee on
Study of Monopoly Power on August 3, 1949. Serial No. 14, Part 1, page 530, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess.; see also, hearings H. R. No. 3408 before the Sub-Committee on Study
of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the judiciary, U. S. House of Representatives,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., page 131; also e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944) (1944-1945 TRADE CASES
§ 57,253); United States v. National City Lines, Inc. et al., 186 F. 2d 562 (C. A. 7, 1951)
(1950-1951 TRADE CASES § 62,757).
44 38 STAT. 730 (1914); 49 STAT. 1526 (1936); 15 U. S. C. § 13.
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act now prescribes that a seller may not charge different
prices for goods of "like grade and quality" if the discrimination causes certain detrimental market effects, unless the practice is "justified" by one of several exculpatory
provisos in 2(a) and 2(b). Sections 2(c), (d) and (e) define and prohibit certain
specified ancillary discriminatory practices. Section 2(f) forbids knowing receipt by
buyers of the discriminatory concessions forbidden in Section 2(a) of the Act. Aside
from these provisions in Section 2, a supplementary criminal prohibition vaguely duplicates and partly overlaps these civil sanctions. Finally, functional discounts and "delivered" price quotations are common pricing practices that create significant legal issues
which derive from the interplay of express and implied prohibitions in the Act.
45 H. R. REP. 627, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., 8-9; id. Pt. 2 at 2-3; S. REP. 698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess., 43-44 (1914).
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concluded that discriminatory concessions from suppliers were in part
responsible for the mass distributor's competitive advantage. The
Commission's study deemed Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as then interpreted in judicial decisions, inadequate to restore a competitive
balance.46 The Robinson-Patman amendments47 of 1936, actually exceeding the Federal Trade Commission's recommendations for legislative revision," superimposed more stringent prohibitions on the existing framework of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, expressly enumerated
conspicuous types of secret concessions, and penalized the discriminatory discounts on which mass buyers were suspected to thrive. The
design of the Robinson-Patman amendments was to facilitate proof
of the substantive violation while narrowing the availability of statutory exceptions for justifying price differentials challenged under the
Act.
In order to understand the reasons why the provisions of old
Section 2 of the Clayton Act were found insufficient to protect competition in 1936, and thereby to properly appraise and interpret the
language of the Robinson-Patman amendment, it is necessary to bear
in mind the current trends of business growth, and the differing types
of injurious price discriminations prevalent, in 1914 and in 1936.
In drafting Section 2 of the original Clayton Act Congress was
chiefly concerned with local or territorial price cutting. 49 Large producers and manufacturers having the benefit of wide distribution
were able to lower their prices in communities where they had competition, while maintaining higher prices elsewhere. Such local price
cutting was intended not for the legitimate purpose of meeting competition, but for the.purpose of putting a local competitor out of business.
The report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives stated:
"Section 2 of the bill * * * is expressly designed with the view of
correcting and forbidding a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby certain great corporations and also certain smaller con46 FEDERAL TRADE CoinssIoN,

FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION,

57-58, 85, 96-97 (1934).
47 38 STAT. 730 (1914); 49 STAT. 1526 (1936); 15 U. S. C. § 13.
48 FEDERAL TRADE COMmISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION,

96-97 (1934).
The Commission had merely recommended a revision of the Clayton Act so as to
declare it illegal "to discriminate unfairly or unjustly between different purchasers."
49 Attention was focused on price cutting practices such as those charged against
the Standard Oil Company in Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W.
371 (1911) ; State v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527 (1910).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 2

cerns which seem to secure a monopoly in trade and commerce by
aping the methods of the great corporations, have heretofore endeavored to destroy competition and render unprofitable the business
of competitors by selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a less
price in the particular communities where their rivals are engaged in
business than at other places throughout the country. * * .,6o

The competition principally affected by this type of discrimination
is, of course, competition with the discriminating seller, not competition between the seller's customers.
This concentration on seller competition is reflected in the peculiar
language of old Section 2 and in the justifications permitted. Price
discrimination was prohibited only where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." In using the term "line of commerce" Congress
evidently was referring to lines of goods rather than levels of competition. In 1923 a United States Circuit Court of Appeals construed
the section to apply only to lessening of competition with the offending seller. 5 ' The Supreme Court later held that "any line of commerce" included the line of commerce engaged in by purchasers as
well as that engaged in by the seller; 52 but it remained doubtful
whether injury to an individual merchant competing locally in the resale of the seller's goods in a competitive industry amounted to a
"substantial lessening of competition" in that line of commerce within
the meaning of the section.5 3 The House Judiciary Committee Report
on the Patman Bill stated:
"The existing law has in practice been too restrictive in requiring
a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line of
commerce concerned, whereas the more immediately important concern
is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. 5' Only
4
through such injury in fact can the larger, general injury result."
Similarly, the proviso permitting unlimited price discriminations
50 H. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
51 Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
52 Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 254, 49 S. Ct. 112, 113-

114, 73 L. Ed. 311, 313-314 (1929). In that case the purchaser was a manufacturer
engaged in a different line of commerce from that of the seller.
53 "Generally speaking (old section 2 of the Clayton Act) required a showing of
effect upon competitive conditions generally in the line of commerce and market territory
concerned, as distinguished from the effect of the discrimination upon immediate competition with the grantor or grantee ... " (80 CoNG. REc. 9417) ; 38 STAT. 730 (1914) ; 15

U. S. C. § 13 (a).
54 H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 8.
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on account of quantities sold, and where made in good faith to meet
competition, indicated a failure to foresee the growth of chain stores
and other large concentrations of buying power and the use of that
power to compel preferential price treatment endangering the survival
of independent local merchants.
In the 1920s and early 1930s the growth of chain stores with
mass buying power in excess of that of the largest wholesalers in many
industries brought about increasing demands for corrective legislation to protect the independents from the use of such buying power to
coerce price discriminations. The United States Wholesale Grocers
Association and other organizations of small businessmen campaigned
for a strong law correcting the weaknesses of the Clayton Act and
curbing the power of the chains. Attention was now directed to price
discriminations injuriously affecting customer competition and to protection of the ability of the individual small businessman to compete
with the chains in local markets.
The Federal Trade Commission completed in 1934 its exhaustive
investigation of chain stores, undertaken at the direction of Congress. 55
The report contained analyses of special discounts and allowances
made by hundreds of manufacturers of grocery, drug and tobacco
products and showed that many of the large chains were receiving discounts greatly in excess of those granted, not only to competing retailers, but even to wholesalers. The report also disclosed competitive
advantages gained by the chains through receipt of brokerage payments, advertising and promotional allowances, and other preferential
treatment not accorded to other purchasers and often granted secretly
without the knowledge of the trade.
The provisions of Section 2 of the Clayton Act had been found
insufficient to cope with these discriminatory practices. The courts
construed the section as permitting quantity discounts without regard
to the amount of the seller's actual cost savings attributable to the
quantities sold and delivered to the particular customer.5 Under the
"meeting competition" proviso a seller could usually justify a discrimination in favor of a chain or other large buyer by showing that one or
r.r Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, SaN. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1934). See also: Hearings before Special Committee on Investigation of American
Retail Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) and Investigation of Trade Practices of
Big Scale Retail and Wholesale Buying and Selling Organizations,74th Cong., Ist & 2d
Sess., 1935-1936.
56 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 101 F. 2d 620 (6th
Cir. 1939).
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more of his competitors were selling or offering to sell on equally
favorable terms. With regard to those provisos the House Judiciary
Committee stated in 1936:
"These provisos have so materially weakened section 2 of that
to amend, as to render it inadequate, if
Act, which this bill proposes
'5 7
not almost a nullity.
As later stated by Federal Trade Commissioner Freer,
"The country became convinced in 1935, that Section 2 of the
Clayton Act had two fatal loopholes. As judicially interpreted, it
placed no limit upon differentials permissible on account of difference
in quantity; it was understood to permit all discriminatory price differences made to meet competition, thus in effect licensing oppressive
retaliation.""8
With the law in this state, apprehension over the accelerated
tendency toward concentration of wealth was widely expressed. It was
felt that absentee ownership was economically and politically undesirable. As was stated in the House, "There is no question but that the
sentiment of the country favors the retention wherever possible of the
independent merchant and local ownership, and the enactment of this
legislation will go as far as the Congress can go in a legitimate effort
to bring this about."59
It was in this atmosphere that the Robinson-Patman bill was
framed and passed. Congressman Patman stated that the bill was
"designed to accomplish what so far the Clayton Act has only weakly
attempted, namely, to protect the independent merchant, the public
whom he serves, and the manufacturer from whom he buys, from exploitation by his chain competitor." 0 The bill was often referred to as
"the chain store bill", although it applies to all classes of marketers.
A milder form of what might be regarded as price discrimination
in the economic sense, although not in the Robinson-Patman Act sense,
may be practiced by a seller who keeps his prices very low or barely
remunerative on products facing competition, while maintaining higher
prices and profit margins on other products free from competition or
facing less competition. In United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,6 for example, the court considered this type of price discrimina57 H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
58 "Introduction to Section 2," CCH Robinson-Patman Act Symposium, 10 (1946).
r9 80 CONG. REC. 10745.
60 79 CoNG. REC. 9078.
61 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam 347 U. S. 521, 74 S. Ct. 699,
98 L. Ed. 910 (1954).
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tion as evidence of monopoly power, but it is significant that it did
not attempt to extirpate such discrimination by its decree. Explaining
its reasons therefor the court stated:
"Some price discrimination, if not too rigid, is inevitable. Some
may be justified as resting on patent monopolies. Some price discrimination is economically desirable, if it promotes competition in a market
where several multiproduct firms compete."62
Price discrimination, in the economic sense, may be practiced by
a monopolist or by a group of sellers acting in concert, because they
wish to build up or protect the position of certain customers, and
weaken that of others. But price discrimination may serve to promote
competition, and it may be relevant evidence that competition exists
and is effective. While price discrimination of the type described above
is therefore relevant to a determination of whether significant degrees
of market power inhere in any individual company or group of companies acting in concert, further exploration is required to determine
whether effective competition exists.
It is equally clear that in some cases differences in price not related to difference in cost may promote competition. Thus price discrimination may serve to disrupt or preclude any collusive or otherwise
independent pricing. The very success of a concerted effort by a group
of firms to raise prices above the competitive level by restricting output to less than the competitive level would make it attractive for some
or all of the firms to offer better terms to some buyers. There is a
tendency for such special bargains to be given more and more widely,
as *buyers try to play sellers off one against the other; and if the
tendency is strorig enough to make the special prices become the
"regular" prices in the course of time, the discrimination has served
to make the market more competitive.
VIII. TRIAL AND EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
ADDED to the complexity of over sixty-three laws relating to antitrust enforcement or exemption, which must be interpreted consistently, is the formidable task of adequately and equitably litigating the
vast number of economic issues to which such legislation gives rise.
As the Judicial Conference Report of September 1951 put it, then
existing conditions, "if permitted to continue * * * might threaten the
62 Id. at 349.
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judicial process itself in respect to complex controversies."0 3 Although
these complications may be alleviated to some extent by pre-trial and
trial administration pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States," it is no easy task to minimize
the vast number of economic and technological issues reflective of
industrial history and operation. The volume of factual material which
must usually be assembled, evaluated, and organized for presentation
in court typically presents a task of staggering proportions. Considerable adaptability and inventiveness on the part of all involved in
the processes of adjudication are necessary if these issues are to be
explored with the uniformed subtlety which they deserve, rather than
dealt with in the broad-axe fashion.6 5
Judges are justifiably sensitive to the fact that in order for them
to properly interpret the evidence offered for their consideration, they
must understand the facts surrounding the business or industrial operation involved. 6 Since a substantial part of anti-trust litigation contemplates monopoly as well as restraint under the Sherman Act,0 7 the
intricacies of "big business" are usually although not always prevalent.
A detailed concept of the nature and method of doing such business
is an integral part of proof prerequisite to offering evidence of illegal
practices. At times it may be more preponderant than the illegalities
themselves because of the direct bearing it may have in construing the
conspiratorial intent of a defendant industry if such be in issue. Add
to the foregoing all of the other evidence indicative of the defendant's
acts and state of mind in consummating and preserving certain alleged
illegal business practices, coupled with a technical evaluation of the
economic result in the absence of a per se violation, and the courts as
well as counsel are faced with a major and lasting project. In view of
the generalities of the Sherman Act and the conflict of decisions resulting from constant changes in our perspective of the economies of the
63 Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on Procedure in Antitrust and
Other ProtractedCases, 13 F. R. D. 62, 64 (1951).
64 Purpose of Rule 16 is to simplify, shorten and possibly avoid a trial. Haywood
v. Maschke, 31 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Penn. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp.
337 (D. Ore. 1939); Ruedy v. Town of White Salmon, 1 F. R. D. 237 (E. D. Wash.
1940), 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 16.3 case No. 1; La Canin v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 140 D. J. Bull. 9, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. case No. 1 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
65 Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. J.
1019 (1949).
66 Medina, A New Judge Tries His First Patent Case, 34 CoRNEJLL L. Q. 220-226
(1948).
67 26 STAT. 209, 210, 50 STAT. 693 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7. See amended sections

1-3, 69 STAT. 282 (1955).
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nation"" regardless of politics, protracted anti-trust litigation seems
almost unavoidable.
One of the puzzling evidentiary problems in considering economic
isues has been that, even without explicit statutory permission, the
Federal Trade Commission may utilize hearsay evidence in making
findings, 9 but the Federal Courts may not.
It is difficult to imagine any satisfactory ground for deciding that
evidence which is admissible before the Federal Trade Commission
is inadmissible before a judge sitting without a jury in a civil antitrust case brought by the Government. There is no difference between
the substantive anti-trust law applied by the Commission and that
applied by the Court. In a civil anti-trust case, the Government has the
unfettered choice of going before a Commission or before a court without a jury. The Commission's cease-and-desist order may in many
cases be as drastic as the decree of a District Court, except for the one
point that the District Court's decree, unlike the Commission's order,
70
can be used as prima facie evidence in a private treble damage suit.

The Commission's hearing officer may be no more experienced or skillful than a District Judge in sifting the reliable hearsay from the untrustworthy hearsay. And the admission of hearsay evidence by a
Commission undercuts just as effectively as the admission of hearsay
by a Court the fundamental objective of the hearsay rule-the opportunity to hear the witness under oath and to subject him to crossexamination.
One other consideration deserves mention. Recent years have
seen a marked increase in the number of social and economic controversies which have been removed from the courts to administrative
agencies for adjudication. Since there is a widespread belief that administrative adjudication gives less security to private interests than
68 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619
(1911).
69 Memorandum on Admissibility of thousands of Intra-Company Documents, dated
March 10, 1950, by Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. (U. S. D. J., District of Mass.) re Civil
Action No. 7198, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. C.
Mass. 1956), citing United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 63 F. Supp. 229 (W. D.
N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 334 U. S. 110, 68 Sup. Ct. 947, 92 L. Ed. 1245 (1948); United States
v.'Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 553 (N. D. Ohio 1942), aff'd, with modifications, 323 U. S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 373, 89 L. Ed. 322 (1945); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 147 F. 2d 93, 118 (6th Cir. 1945); United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 978 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52
F. Supp. 751, 755 (D. Del. 1943); see also, Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 139 F. 2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1944).

70 Id., citing 38 STAT. 731 (1914) ; 15 U. S. C. § 16. Amended July 7, 1955, 69 STAT.
283, 15 U. S. C. § 16.
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does judicial process, 71 many persons regret this trend. Yet the original
demand for administrative adjudication was traceable, in part at least,
to the unwillingness of courts to admit evidence which they allowed
administrative agencies to receive and act upon. And that demand
would be reinforced if the courts were to continue to say that in social
and economic controversies where the remedy is not imprisonment, afine, or damages, but an order prescribing future conduct, a court
sitting without jury cannot receive hearsay evidence even though without statutory authority an administrative agency couid do so. To
preserve their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of con72
troversy relax the rigidity of the hearsay rule.
IX. CONCLUSION
So uncertain 3 and confused have our legislated economic rights
and remedies become over the years that one pauses to wonder whether
or not the application of common law concepts with a minimum of
legislation would not have been more versatile and realistic. Economic
facts affecting competition at best are difficult to obtain on an over-all
national level, because of overlapping and conflicting economies. They
cannot be evaluated wisely or with equitable perspective unless the
clarification of rights and remedies or some other method of simplification makes thdm better understood in the light of current public
interest. The road to clarification and economic realism is not a short
one, however. One of the milestones in the right direction has been
the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to study the
Anti-trust Laws, dated March 31, 1955. The next milestone must be a
full economic investigation as suggested by this same Committee.
Prognosis from there on must depend upon the findings of such an
investigation. Except for simplifying our trial procedures by appropriate court administration, we must in the meantime cope with the
substantive problems of competition with infinite patience, if not with
infinite wisdom.
71 Id., citing Ng. Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 285, 42 S. Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.
Ed. 938, 943 (1922).
72 Judge Wyzanski's conclusion following his foregoing commentary on the need for
liberalizing hearsay rules in civil antitrust suits. See also judge's opinion admitting letters
preserved in files of business instructions, business reports of action taken pursuant to
those instructions and business suggestions for future conduct as being contemplated by
the regular business entry statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1732 (1948) for the truth of the events
contained therein with certain limitations as reported in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 354-355 (D. C. Mass. 1950).
73 The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, dated March 31, 1955, at page 368, recognizes "the uncertainty of antitrusts'
standards" as a "plague" to "good faith business efforts."

